<Joerg-Neo900>
[2017-09-11 Mon 19:41:39] <metacollin> Replace: \1\nF 4 "MF-CAP-\3-\2" H 10 10 60 0001 C CNN "MPN"
<Joerg-Neo900>
;-D
<Joerg-Neo900>
so much for the BOM other layouters said was mandatory. We keep that in *.sch resp inside kicad at least
<jonwil>
Sounds like there is something vaguely resembling progress on the next iteration of the Neo900 PCB...
<Joerg-Neo900>
yes, we contracted metacollin
<Joerg-Neo900>
see /topic
<jonwil>
Nice.
<Joerg-Neo900>
finally a layouter who knows kicad, is available for "fulltime commercial" work, *AND* is personally interested in the project
<Joerg-Neo900>
I personally would think metacollin is the best thing happening to the project since wpwrak joined
<jonwil>
I wonder how hard it would be to implement full disk encryption on Maemo Fremantle (either on N900 or Neo900).
<Joerg-Neo900>
I think some N900 users already got that
err0r3o3 has quit [Ping timeout: 240 seconds]
<Joerg-Neo900>
performance wise it's obviously a massive impact though
<Joerg-Neo900>
I'm not sure if there's hw crypt acceleration
arnaudj has quit [Ping timeout: 260 seconds]
arnaudj1 has joined #neo900
<jonwil>
It would be an interesting experiment to try and get something like TrueCrypt (one of those forks that have been verified free of backdoors I guess) running though, I bet if it was implemented properly with high strength encryption keys it would be even harder for an attacker to crack open than whatever Apple was using that gave the FBI so much trouble...
<jonwil>
Assuming you protected those keys with a decent hard-to-guess passphrase or something that is
arnaudj1 is now known as arnaudj
<Joerg-Neo900>
jonwil: you are aware of RX-51_2009SE_crypto.tar.gz ? I got no real idea what's that
<jonwil>
I dont know what that is either.
<jonwil>
I dont have any real reason to worry about encryption though, my phone
<jonwil>
My phone is almost always right near me (or in my house safe from being stolen)
err0r3o3 has joined #neo900
<jonwil>
And I dont keep anything particularly sensitive on the device
<jonwil>
Not that I particularly want to try and flash anything to my device in any case (the USB port isn't in tip top condition and I dont have a system capable of running the flasher right now)
<pigeons>
^^ A Hardware Privacy Monitor for iPhones (schneier.com)
bl33d15 has quit [Ping timeout: 240 seconds]
galiven has quit [Ping timeout: 255 seconds]
galiven has joined #neo900
threebar has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds]
jonwil has quit [Read error: Connection reset by peer]
<Joerg-Neo900>
pigeons: yep, we know this, not exactly new news
Pali has joined #neo900
<Joerg-Neo900>
we thoroughly analyzed their approach and found a few flaws in it - worst of them being the poor expense/benefit ratio since a simple killswitch would have done the same. Anyway Neo900 is way beyond what Snaowden&Bunnie are creating there
<pigeons>
yeah
<Joerg-Neo900>
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/09/a_hardware_priv.html random quote >> "You don't have to trust us." That is just wrong. This blog has been full of reports of people who put up security apparatus that has failed, because the authors didn't know enough about security to do it right.<<
<Joerg-Neo900>
you may trust Neo900 since we offer full disclosure of the hardware
<Joerg-Neo900>
so you can check with your own eyes what you get
bl33d15 has joined #neo900
<Joerg-Neo900>
doesn't apply to any iPhone, no matter how "smart" the piggyback "security" strapon
<Joerg-Neo900>
they use a RF control bus to deduce what the phone is doing. For that to work you first need to know and undersand the phone
<Joerg-Neo900>
understand, even
<Joerg-Neo900>
>>Snowden has name recognition, but beyond that, does anyone really have knowledge of his technical skills?<< ;-)
<Joerg-Neo900>
>>Good points, but the primary use case seems to be for people who turn their phone off at a sensitive meeting, and want a device just to ensure that it's actually off, without having to carry a cage. It doesn't really serve a purpose when the phone is on and regularly squawking to everything nearby.<<
<Joerg-Neo900>
(cont.d) >>Unfortunately, the obvious easy workaround is to just record a conversation, then exfiltrate it once the phone has turned back on. A Faraday cage can't guard against that either, though it might muffle the sound some. You'd have to monitor the chip's electrical levels at a much deeper level than seems possible here to guard against that.<<
<Joerg-Neo900>
which is exactly what Neo900 does
threebar has joined #neo900
threebar has quit [Changing host]
threebar has joined #neo900
xmn has joined #neo900
<Joerg-Neo900>
basucs: the linux is considered safe since user has 100% control over it (unlike all those proprietary phone-OS), and anything we don't have control over (read: modem) is sandboxed and also has a true killswitch controlled by safe linux
<Joerg-Neo900>
basics:*
<Joerg-Neo900>
as opposed to >> Asaresult,thisworkstartswiththeassumptionthataphonecanandwillbe compromised.<<
<Joerg-Neo900>
when the phone got compromised like S&B assume, there's zilch that can save you from getting recorded by the phone and *later on* the recorded data gets sneaked out wrapped into normal expected data communication like phonecalls or accessing the internet
<Joerg-Neo900>
the whole thing is flawed by concept