sipa changed the topic of #bitcoin-wizards to: This channel is for discussing theoretical ideas with regard to cryptocurrencies, not about short-term Bitcoin development | http://bitcoin.ninja/ | This channel is logged. | For logs and more information, visit http://bitcoin.ninja
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<IniGit>
hello
<IniGit>
can somebody thell me how does it work in rsk "lock bitocoins". What the underlying technology of the lock ?
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<Taek>
This is an idea that's a work in progress, but I wanted to throw it out there, and it's something I intend to keep working on.
<Taek>
In Sia, we get protection from bad hosts by storing data on a bunch of hosts at high redundancy, and essentially making it inconsequential if a few fail
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<Taek>
Then we also construct the incentives so that as a host, you are always losing money if you are being a bad host
<Taek>
This sort of idea I think can be applied to blockchains as a whole to get very strong scalability. Like, maybe 100x or 10,000x scalability improvements over Bitcoin today
<Taek>
Basically, you have a bunch of tiny, relatively disposable blockchains instead of one very large one
<Taek>
and each user is going to use maybe 50 or 100 of them
<Taek>
you set the parameters such that, though they are relatively easy to attack, miners only lose money by doing so
<Taek>
^ this btw is not a simple problem, I've handwaved over what is essentially an open problem
<Taek>
But at this time I believe it to be a solveable problem
<Taek>
The blockchains interoperate through a multi-chain lightning network
<Taek>
And then as a user you pick chains that are popular within your social circles and spending circles (e.g. you pick chains that are shared with your landlord, your grocery store, etc.)
<kanzure>
"miners lose money by doing so" is basically a variation of pow change + freezing previous miner rewards
<kanzure>
(why would you let adversarial miners continue to spend money on further attacking the network in future? that's an awful lot of coins loaded up into earlier parts of history.)
<Taek>
the core issue is that generally as a miner you can get more money by doing a 51% attack if you have the hashrate to do so
<Taek>
so you'd want some mechanism to deter 51% attacks. For example, you could dump your coins if you see blocks getting orphaned or something
<Taek>
but... that is not a great solution because then miners can do griefing, where they cause everyone to dump and then they can scoop up cheap coins
<kanzure>
well-behaving markets basically kick out manipulative traders, so there's that.
<Taek>
If each chain is like 1 hour block time, 5 kb blocksize limit (or some other low-power parameter), running 50 or 100 on a single machine is not an issue
<kanzure>
s/markets/exchanges
<jephalien>
I feel a lot of extreme scaling proposals will evolve convergently looking like "proof of stake" using the latter term very loosely
<Taek>
Then you can have an ecosystem with say, 100,000,000 different chains, and they all overlap in complicated ways (the same way social networks all overlap in complicated ways), but essentially, just like the Internet, you can make a payment to any chain through the lightning network
<Taek>
then you have a huge amount of global on-chain data, but one person is only ever looking at some tiny fraction of it to verify all of their coins
<Taek>
If you can pull off this tiny-chains stuff, you can do things like run full nodes in-browser
<jephalien>
What about the comment that in order to scale, LN "super" nodes will require significant stake. At some point these stakers will try to extract rent unless we are to believe they are altruists. Or is LN not a good proposal in your view?
<kanzure>
i think your handwaving ignores the whole "have one primary chain so that everyone is incentivized to work together, instead of splitting hashrate between malicious and non-malicious hashing activities". when you don't know that they are committing the total hashrate (without incurring opportunity cost), then you lose out on the benefits of proof-of-work as a way of deciding costly ...
<kanzure>
...anti-forge history.
<kanzure>
jephalien: you're welcome to do LN simulations if you want.
<jephalien>
honest question ^_^;;;
<jephalien>
I may just do as you suggest though..
<kanzure>
honest recommendation. simulations.
<jephalien>
I'm sure it has occurred to somebody to simulate it already though
<kanzure>
so?
<Taek>
jephalien: LN supernodes can be avoided on a per-user basis. If your only connections to the lightning network are to your friends and common places of business, you have protected yourself against supernode failure
<kanzure>
you could review their work, but i doubt that there is nothing left to work on.
<Taek>
well... as long as your friends are all also doing the same thing. It doesn't help if you are the only person who is not using a supernode.
<kanzure>
a while back one of the lightning network bootstrapping proposals was something like, picking randomly from.. uh. i forget what set.
<jephalien>
maybe a better simulation might be whether I end up doing business with friends or strangers most of the time
<jephalien>
and in the case of friends, do we need a trustless system
<jephalien>
interesting
* jephalien
off to simulate *
<kanzure>
you can have a channel with someone even if you don't "do business with them". why would that matter?
<Taek>
One thing that we can leverage in the tinychains system is that it's really easy to detect both 51% attacks and also censorship attacks. If there are high-fee transactions that aren't getting mined, this is visible censorship. And if you have an inclusive chain with blocks that aren't being included, this is an obvious 51% attack
<kanzure>
why is it visible if it's not in the global publication channel?
<Taek>
but you can only detect these attacks in real-time. If you are new to a chain, you can't tell whether there's been an attack recently or not
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<jephalien>
I'm interested in learning why I would open a payments channel between me and someone I don't plan on doing business with
<kanzure>
jephalien: negative fees, probably.
<Taek>
kanzure: the reason you would only open channels with people you do business with is because you know they are not Sybils
* jephalien
off to rtfm *
<kanzure>
Taek: huh? so you wouldn't have a channel with me? i am disappoint.
<Taek>
kanzure: "If your only connections to the lightning network are to your friends and..."
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<belcher>
trying to come up with a way to make p2pool better, thinking of having the block reward pay to a hub which has one-way payment channels open to all the hashers, been thinking of ways to make it trustless that the hub can only take the block reward money if all the payment channels are updated to send money to each hasher in the right amounts
<Taek>
belcher: would you not consider it sufficient to just get paid for each work one partial solution at a time?
<belcher>
that could work too
<Taek>
if you are only providing 5 cents worth of puzzles at a time, or even 0.1 cents worth of puzzles at a time, then there's really not much harm in someone taking the money and running
<belcher>
the reason i thought for the hub thing is when p2pool actually solves a block it has actually-existing bitcoins
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<Taek>
my biggest issue with p2pool is that it clutters the chain. Every miner getting paid with a different output means that coinbase transactions now have dozens to hundres of outputs
<Taek>
seems to me like payment channel based pool mining (where the pool lets you select the transactions) is sufficient
<Taek>
it's equally decentralized as long as you can find one pool that will form a payment channel with you and let you choose transactions - though you do have to find such a pool
<Taek>
err, equally trustless I guess
<belcher>
how would that be trustless? since the pool could still cheat the hashers like pools could today
<belcher>
thats just normal pooling except the hashers get paid with a payment channel instead of a blockchain tx
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<Taek>
belcher: the pools can only cheat the hashers to the tune of one payment. You are talking a few cents worth of cheating
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<Taek>
if a pool cheats you and is refusing to pay you fairly, you move to a different pool. You didn't lose much
<belcher>
how is that different from normal pooling?
<Taek>
the pools today that I'm familiar with only do payouts every few dollars
<Taek>
so the opportunity to cheat can be actually meaningful
<Taek>
Also, iirc payouts happen on-chain, which is again unneeded clutter
<belcher>
that would still let the pool choose transactions and contribute to miner centralization, sure pools could use payment channels to pay their hashers but im not interested in thinking about that, rather i care about making p2pool better
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<Taek>
if you are using getblocktemplate, you can have a pool where the hashers are allowed to choose the transactions
<belcher>
right, because the hasher's own full node chooses transactions from its mempool
<Taek>
right, so what part is missing? You have hashers that are getting paid fairly, allowed to choose their own transactions, and have very low variance in their monthly revenue. What other advantages do you get with p2pool?
<belcher>
so is this the actual reason that p2pool isnt more widely used? i thought it was that its variance of payouts is too high
<Taek>
my impression has been that's it's more of a comfort thing. People like using the thing that's familar and has tutorials, and p2p was never able to get traction because the UX was foreign
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<belcher>
an issue is the hashers dont directly care about decentralized mining, they just want payouts and if that means surrendering their entire hashing power to a pool then it will happen, then if a pool gets too big everyone has to make noises on forums to get hashers to leave the pool
<belcher>
so i guess p2pool isnt the solution to our problems then, maybe just education to get hashers to care
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<Taek>
yeah, agree. Miners are always largely content as long as they continue to make money. It means there's a lot of wiggle room for centralization pressures, because nobody with hardware actually pays attention to it
<Taek>
Do you have statistics on what percentage of mining is done from small machines though? Isn't the majority of mining done in datacenters now anyway?
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<belcher>
yes, so hasher/ASIC centralization is an issue as well as pool/miner centralization
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<gmaxwell>
07:54:22 < Taek> my biggest issue with p2pool is that it clutters the chain. Every miner getting paid with a different output means that coinbase transactions now have dozens to hundres of outputs
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<gmaxwell>
p2pool controls that precisely.
<gmaxwell>
and has for years.
<gmaxwell>
there isn't any more outputs in p2pool than it intends to make.
<Taek>
gmaxwell: but there is still one per miner, per block, is there not?
<gmaxwell>
no.
<Taek>
oh, then I have a misunderstanding about how miners get payouts
<gmaxwell>
It adapts the share difficulty to control the numper of outputs.
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<belcher>
if p2pool increased the PPLNS window to reduce volatility then the coinbase would have to get bigger
<gmaxwell>
belcher: not if it increases the difficulty at the same time.
<belcher>
but then small hashers still experience a higher variance of payout (i meant to say variance in the last message not volatility)
<gmaxwell>
which it did previously, basically there is a tradeoff between block volatility and share volitility... and some ratio of window size and minimum share difficulty the minimizes overall variance for a given pool hashrate.
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<belcher>
if this payment channel thing could work then the PPLNS window could be increased a lot and it would still allow small hashers to be paid without dust and with less variance
<belcher>
also block space is quite expensive now, 300sat/b or so, so making the coinbase smaller allows for a higher income for the miners
<belcher>
also i read some larger miner left p2pool because of too many dead-on-arrival shares, if the share interval was actually increased it would reduce that, but that would raise variance
<gmaxwell>
belcher: people are unfortunately really confused about that...
<gmaxwell>
DOA shares are normal and harmless so long as you don't have more than other users.
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<gmaxwell>
unfortunately the software makes the mistake of showing the absolute number.
<belcher>
i got the impression he had a worse connection so they were higher than others, didnt read it in detail though so maybe its what you're saying
<gmaxwell>
Also there are some mining devices with phenominal latencies that have just been incompatible with the fast retargeting needed for a more rapid chain.
<gmaxwell>
well if they had a worse connection then their blocks were also more likely to be stale and they should be paid somewhat less.
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<belcher>
what would be the downsides of increasing the PPLNS window? i can think that it makes the coinbase tx bigger and they'll be more individual payouts which get closer to dust values
<belcher>
i know variance averages out over a long period, but it still has costs, a major point of pooling in the first place is to reduce variance
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<gmaxwell>
belcher: makes the software slower and more bandwidth hungry... minor psychlogoical disincentive to join, since you'll be paying for other people for longer.
<belcher>
how about the p2pool block reward goes to a chaumian bank, and shares are valid if they give each hasher the right amount of tokens that they can redeem from the bank
<belcher>
thats is centralized though, someone could DDOS the bank and stop p2pool from working
<gmaxwell>
yes, there are lots of ways to do mining with a TTP to hold the funds.
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<max890_>
hello, i'm very new in this bitcoin topic. I'm interested in running a node that supports multy-currency [15:00] <max890> anybody can help me to clarify this?
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<Taek>
#bitcoin
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<IniGit>
hi
<IniGit>
can somebody tell me why is it important where the majority of the hash power is. If lets say 30% ming there and 30% there and 30% there then it simply is like this any we have 3 coins instead of 1, because there are 3 different blockchains.
<IniGit>
why is there only one chain is the majority mines that chain
<IniGit>
nemvermind i understand know
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<IniGit>
"However, if less than 51% of the hashing power switches to the new version, the blockchain-fork will not mend automatically as the chain created under the old rules has more hashing power and is incompatible to the new rules. This can either be remedied by the adopters of the softfork giving up their chain, or more hashing power switching to the softfork chain. The latter would cause
<IniGit>
the softfork chain to eventually overtake and reorganize the other chaintip." Can it be that in a softfork the chain with lower hashpower becomes superior because the old chain does not accept new blocks from the new chain?
<sipa>
IniGit: the old software not accepting blocks from the new chain is the definition of a hard fork
<IniGit>
my question is for softfork
<IniGit>
and the quotation is from softfork text
<sipa>
in the case of a soft fork, new software will enforce rules that old software didn't
<sipa>
if a minority of the hashrate runs the soft fork code, they'll create a separate chain
<IniGit>
yes can it be that new software gets adopted even if the most mining power is at old software
<sipa>
als the majority hashrate will be acceptable to old software, but not to new
<sipa>
sure, UASF
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<IniGit>
Ok I try it an other way can it be that the new chain overtakes the old one even if the hashing power of the new chain is lower?
<IniGit>
overtakes = longer chain
<sipa>
no, that's definitionally not possible
<sipa>
longer chain is defined as more hashrate :)
<sipa>
(well, more accumulated hashrate)
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<IniGit>
why. old one does not accepot blocks from new one. But new one does accept both
<IniGit>
isnÄ''t longer chain defined as more blocks?
<sipa>
no
<sipa>
number of blocks is irrelevant
<sipa>
what matters is the amount of work that went into it
<IniGit>
how does the distributed system know where more hashing power is
<IniGit>
if not from the blockcount
<IniGit>
when not from the blockcount
<sipa>
by validating the chain, you know the difficulty of each block. the sum of the difficulties is the amount of work
<IniGit>
and by what does the difficulty adjust itself?
<IniGit>
time of last X mined block?
<IniGit>
blocks
<Taek>
IniGit: these are #bitcoin level questions, and they are all explained pretty well I think by the Bitcoin Developers Guide
<Taek>
please read up some more before coming here