sipa changed the topic of #bitcoin-wizards to: This channel is for discussing theoretical ideas with regard to cryptocurrencies, not about short-term Bitcoin development | http://bitcoin.ninja/ | This channel is logged. | For logs and more information, visit http://bitcoin.ninja
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<bsm117532>
Can't we just convince you guys to attend! ;-)
<othe>
sure, gimme a beer and i annoy u weekly form july on -.-
<bsm117532>
We provide free beer and pizza! ;-)
<bsm117532>
Though, you might be asked to present a paper. ;-)
<othe>
yeah actually ivan already asked me.
<bsm117532>
It's the price of being a -wizard...
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<bsm117532>
So I've had a few conversations here with people about p2pool and why it's not used more widely. I just started mining Ethereum this weekend for shits & giggles. The pool I'm on is very clearly inflating my share numbers. If this is common practice, anyone moving from a centralized pool to p2pool would see an "apparent" drop in hashrate.
<bsm117532>
Also, I'm pretty disappointed at the appearance of (and success of) pools on Ethereum. 5760 blocks/day isn't enough to prevent centralization, it seems. It's hashrate is currently equivalent to each miner with a high-end video card earning one block (5 ether) per month. Equivalently, 173,000 contributors with high-end cards, roughly.
<bsm117532>
My calculations with braids indicate that there is not more than a factor of 10 relative to Ethereum that can be eeked out of a Nakamoto-style consensus algorithm, due to the latency inherent in the size of the Earth, and network topology.
<bsm117532>
By a factor 10 I mean in the number of rewards per day. Regardless of the reward, this is the variance indicator for a small miner.
<bsm117532>
If I don't get a reward in a day/week/month, I'm not going to bother, as an individual.
<mappum>
bsm117532: where can i read about braids?
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<bsm117532>
Ethereum needs to put out the word, in a very strong way, to not use pools for miners with multiple video cards involved. Their fantasy that PoS is a thing that exists and they can switch to is damaging the security of their network.
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<luke-jr>
bsm117532: this isn't ##altcoin-dev
<bsm117532>
luke-jr: That's a nice constructive comment you've got there.
<luke-jr>
would you prefer I just kick you?
<bsm117532>
luke-jr: Go ahead. I'm very clearly discussing -wizard material. Your anti-ether stance is not useful.
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<fluffypony>
nsh: I take it we would read the paper(s) before the hangout?
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<da2ce7>
hello all :)
<da2ce7>
A bitcoin-history question: What was the original behavour of the Satoshi client for dealing with replacement transctions. Was the first clients first-seen-safe?
<phantomcircuit>
da2ce7, blindly replace by sequence number i believe
<phantomcircuit>
which was only disabled because it was a trivial denial of service issue
<da2ce7>
without the sequence number feild set it was first-seen-safe?
<phantomcircuit>
i really don't like calling anything that's relying on unconfirmed transactions safe
<phantomcircuit>
since they're the exact opposie
<phantomcircuit>
opposite*
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<da2ce7>
I completely agree. I'm wondering what the behavour was, whatever you call it.
<da2ce7>
I suppose it just ignored replacement transcations without a sequence number
<phantomcircuit>
da2ce7, i believe the mempool logic rigidly followed the sequence number
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<da2ce7>
cool; thankyou. :)
* da2ce7
goes into the git time-mashine.
<da2ce7>
*machine
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<nsh>
fluffypony, yeah, decided in advance
<nsh>
maybe more than one paper per session depending on length/difficulty
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<fluffypony>
nsh: awesome - I'm so in
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<nsh>
okay, grand. i'll write a thing and make a place for suggestions for papers to cover and most accessible time to have the hangout (unless we find a better forum)
<fluffypony>
Mumble might be an option, low bandwidth requirements and its audio only
<smooth>
bsm117532: there is a lot of history with many alts that people use pools regardless of just about anything
<smooth>
you could get a block an hour, people still use pools
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<bsm117532>
smooth: Do you understand this dynamic of people using pools? Is it psychology or something? Because if you make a block an hour, variance is not an argument to use a pool.
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<nsh>
amiller, are you the Miller that the authors of this extractable witness encryption and timed-release encrpytion from bitcoin paper mention having a discussion with? the references seem to have been cut from the preprint
<nsh>
oh no, i misread. they only refer to discussion in a public chatroom (likely here)
<amiller>
nsh, yes
<nsh>
have you considered the paper? looks interesting
<nsh>
i need to understand how extractable witness encryption works first though i guess
<amiller>
i think its really interesting :)
<amiller>
it's heavyweight crypto
* nsh
nods
<maaku_>
bsm117532: not everyone is double-digit percentages of the network
* nsh
wonders why a witness must be a certain length
<nsh>
it's clear what this means, but i wonder if we should have a distinct existential operator for existing-and-being-known
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<bsm117532>
maaku_: That's why I brought up the numbers for Ethereum...because the pool-usage doesn't seem to be drastically different despite a 40x decrease in block time, and corresponding decrease in variance. My hypothesis thus far was that pool usage was primarily due to variance reduction. I'm clearly wrong...
<othe>
no you aren´t, it´s a mix of variance, comfort, lazyness and bad tooling
<bsm117532>
othe: I do think the slick UI's of pools I've seen are a contributor, as well as the ease of running cgminer vs. setting up a node.
<othe>
yeah and there was no open src pool software
<waxwing>
wouldn't pools be appealing due to orphan rates too? my gut feeling was that mining would become very centralized with fast block times due to costs of latency.
* waxwing
has never been a miner...
<othe>
so naturally they all hang on one pool and are too lazy to switch
<bsm117532>
Well...I can fix that waxwing... and it's not as bad on Ethereum as bitcoin due to their uncle treatment.
<bsm117532>
I admit to looking at pool lists for who had the lowest uncle rate...
<waxwing>
yes uncles i accept ameliorates, but i would suspect not enough
<waxwing>
with such extreme latency-sensitive mining
<bsm117532>
The latency sensitivity is a timing assumption and a design flaw, that can be removed.
<waxwing>
you can make latency irrelevant? wow :)
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<bsm117532>
Yes. Make the block rewar something that is evaluated N blocks later, rather than causing a race.
<waxwing>
ah, i see. sounds cool. have a vague feeling i heard about it before.
<bsm117532>
Been working on it for a while...damn day job...
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<nsh>
one day ivy league university dns servers will stop shouting at irc
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<midnightmagic>
Implementation flaws in a specific alt-currency or pools thereof, or whose developers viciously attack other devs, is a non-theoretical (antagonistic) short-term development topic. :-/
<bsm117532>
midnightmagic: Finding a way to prevent pooling is not, however...
<bsm117532>
Would love to hear ideas...
<nsh>
notion: enforcing randomised and shifting coalitions is tantamount to preventing static, socially or geographically bound coalitions
<nsh>
conjecture: pooling can be prevented by requiring people to pool randomly at small levels in a manner that is tied to pseduo-identity value
<bsm117532>
nsh: And now we're walking a fine line back to PBFT.
<bsm117532>
Node self-identification can't be enforced, except by centralized power.
<nsh>
well, wanting to retain your ability to spend your coin can be enforced
<nsh>
or motivated
<nsh>
or we can rely on extrinsic motivation thereto
<bsm117532>
I believe that's called "proof of stake"...
* nsh
nods
<nsh>
but has anyone considered a stake-tied requirement to cooperate with random partners on the network?
<nsh>
or are you suggesting it'll be difficult to enforce for the same reasons that most PoS models fall down
<bsm117532>
nsh: Yes I'm suggesting the latter.
<nsh>
(the block reward mechanism itself is roughly a stake-tied requirement to cooperate with a random partner on the network)
<nsh>
it's just that it applies to everyone that sees a valid block at once
<nsh>
if we can make it apply to uniformly selected small subsets of nodes continuously then maybe it's useful
<nsh>
but that could just be another way of talking about braids; i don't know
<midnightmagic>
an extension of p2pool sharechains, with more-correct, fractional coinbase payouts and specified- or un-specified membership therein is probably the only way for PoW-like security. anti-withholding mechs wouldn't work so well on decentralized pools. plus none of this is meaningful without commoditized mass-availability of smart-property mining devices and an ejection of established
<bsm117532>
Bitcoin is open and PBFT is closed precisely because nodes need not self-identify. I also worry that one is walking a line between a 33% security guarantee (PBFT) and a 51% security guarantee (Nakamoto) by mixing the two.
<midnightmagic>
PoS obviates the risk equation. there could be no calculation of work-required to revert all of established history.
<nsh>
considering the asymptotic nonfundibility of bitcoin hashpower, there maybe 'plenty of room' between 33% and 51%
<nsh>
*fungibility
<nsh>
that's probably not the best phrasing. i mean it gets progressively wider a gap
<nsh>
assuming that miners continue to represent the extreme of energy-efficient hashing
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<bsm117532>
The problem is how do you cryptographically prove *anything* about miners. All we have at present is the hash values they provide, and the timestamps they include.
<bsm117532>
One thing that has been floating in my head...one can use commitments of Sequential Proofs of Work to measure inter-node latency. One can then include consensus rules that dis-incentivize miner aggregation.
<waxwing>
as someone once said, identity is not the solution, it's the problem ;)
<bsm117532>
I've been fooling with incentive models that incentivize low-latencies. But this also incentivizes pooling, and not using Tor/I2P or other anonymizing relay networks.
<bsm117532>
With enough data (and cryptographic commitments thereto -- such as SPoW) one could create an incentivization model that places miners equi-distributed on the surface of the Earth.
<bsm117532>
But...that creates some bizarre incentives like putting mining nodes in the middle of the Pacific.
* bsm117532
prefers data over identity.
<bsm117532>
Anyone have any other ideas of kinds of data that could be cryptographically obtained about miners?
<katu>
bsm117532: are commitments even needed for this? one thing you can do is force cluster assignments in a NUMS fashion (introduce random cluster bias)
<katu>
so the more "sybils" (for lack of better term) somebody has are forced to spread out and not form cliques
<bsm117532>
katu: can you elaborate? I'm not familiar with NUMS. You probably need commitments because otherwise the measurements will be gamed.
<katu>
how can you game rtt?
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<katu>
bsm117532: as for NUMS clustering assignments, see TorCoin. They use central consensus for this, but its possible to go without it if privacy of assignments is not necessary
<kanzure>
waxwing: identity is definitely a problem, but also i think our whole architecture here is pretty broken (i mean, nobody really thinks that a system with 7 billion attesters would be stable - people will drop off or act maliciously or whatever).. more philosophically, there's not too many good reasons to have transactions at all, it's more like a routing/planning error the more you have to send additional transactions.
<waxwing>
kanzure: i'm a bit lost - no good reasons to have transactions? what else would we have? :)
<nsh>
nums is just "nothing up my sleeves" - a mechanism to get a stream of entropy that we can be assured isn't biased to benefit anybody
<kanzure>
waxwing: well, i'm assuming a system without people. i think people complicate things, and that's why we haven't figured out a suitable decentralization implementation.
<kanzure>
waxwing: and without people, i think you can forego transactions (probably)
<waxwing>
the zen of bitcoin :)
* nsh
smiles
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<kanzure>
if you (poorly!) define decentralization as number of people that are attesting to state/validity/ordering, then you end up with 7 billion people signing every block (which will have super high latency and due to downtime no blocks would ever get signed at all)
<kanzure>
*due to individual node downtime
<kanzure>
not to mention sybil problems with picking "7 billion" or other collusion/cartel/coercion problems..
<nsh>
i suppose you can go inductively from it being pretty impossible with infinity people, to largely manageable with 1 person, to absolutely ideal with 0 people
<kanzure>
0 people is the trustless setup SNARKs case, right?
<nsh>
also this generalises to a surprisingly broad range of problems
<c0rw1n>
hmm then one could imagine crypto-signing of all the data from absolutely total surveillance, to see who even tried to collude/cartelize/coerce
<nsh>
surewhynot
<kanzure>
if you assume total surveillance then i think a bunch of other things break. presumably all collusion is private.
<kanzure>
maintaining a file that defines your trust lines is an interesting strategy but i think nobody proposed a way to do consensus off of that, i think you just end up with lots of pockets of distrust and history incompatibility which is contrary to the purpose of a universal ledger
<c0rw1n>
hmm could cluster the ledgers by compatibility
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<c0rw1n>
( i've had a huge idea that that is a part of but it's totally not -wizards material and it needs to be written up properly some day )
<bsm117532>
kanzure: (and everyone) remove the word "trust" from the conversation, and see where it leads. In my experience, "trust" is a word that is usually used as a proxy for a different concept, that can be measured in a different way.
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<kanzure>
no i was talking about "trust lines" the concept
<bsm117532>
e.g. trust = default risk? willing to not validate data? etc.
<kanzure>
or er, maybe the implementation
<kanzure>
no, the thing called "trust lines"
<bsm117532>
kanzure: You'll have to be more specific, I don't know what that means... ;-)
<kanzure>
it's from ripple :(
<c0rw1n>
Riple ?
<c0rw1n>
yeah.
<c0rw1n>
the good idea that god fucked all ways to hell
<c0rw1n>
*got
<bsm117532>
Eh...Ripple just moves default risk to "gateways". Their concept of "trust" is a proxy for "default risk of gateways". Now tell me who is auditing them for that purpose and I'll tell you what I think of Ripple.
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<belcher>
bsm117532 could it be simply that the setup is easier for pools, you just point your mining software to the pool and go, with something like p2pool or solo you need to sync your own node
<bsm117532>
belcher: that's most definitely a factor.
<kanzure>
if that was true then someone would have tried that silly "validationless mining" stuff by now
<belcher>
iv found my joinmarket has less adoption than lending btc for margin on the bitfinex exchange, partly because its easier and partly because the advertising is less
<belcher>
the returns are similar, less for joinmarket on a risk-adjusted basis
<belcher>
err, more*
<bsm117532>
belcher: I bet if JoinMarket was simply called an "exchange", you'd double your usage.
<belcher>
maybe build a GUI yield generator with a fancy new name